1. The lie. If there is something that is not tolerated in the united States is the lie. The lie has ended up with presidents. And the breaking of that trust, the trust in the manufacturers to time delegate to them the certification of their products, have such serious consequences, or more, as the fraud committed. That fact became very apparent when Michael Horn was brought in the Congress of the united States to clarify what happened. An appearance in which he spoke often of lies, deceit, and disappointment, with some representatives of the chamber recognizing that from years ago, are customers of Volkswagen. So the only way that you can continue to the Volkswagen Group from now on is transparency and, of course, does not hide any finding by damaging that may be for the brand. A good example of this line to continue what we have in the fact that Volkswagen has recognized a new irregularity, this time on the fuel consumption and the emissions of CO2, at 800,000 cars.
2. greed. Although the fraud of NOx has reached a global impact, the most plausible explanation of the problem we have in the interests placed by the Volkswagen Group in the united States. In Europe we are convinced that their TDI could have gone forward without the need of fraud, defeat devices, and other tricks illegal. But the legislation relating to NOx emissions, more rigid in the united States, did Volkswagen apostase by this trick to ensure that your diesel could come into play on the other side of the Atlantic. Volkswagen bet with force by the diesel in order to convince the buyer to us of its benefits. The problem is that now we know that they were playing with marked cards.
recently I talked precisely of this, of how the competitive culture of the brand and objectives, perhaps unattainable, had led to this situation.
3. hierarchy and the compartmentalization of trade marks sometimes raises serious problems. The case Volkswagen is not the only one in which it has been shown that the hierarchy of brands, the division into departments, and the lack of communication between these, often get that the margin of manoeuvre of a manufacturer in a case as serious as this to be reduced. How is it possible that a team of engineers (according to the official thesis) is to be in charge of carrying out a fraud with repercussions that are so important for a giant of the automobile industry like Volkswagen? For a moment we believe the official thesis, which exempts its implication to the heads of the brand. And is that, according to the evidence, and the facts, there are so many arguments to defend the certainty of this thesis, as the of give by the way, that we are in a plan that was hatched in the highest echelons of Volkswagen.
These questions as we did in its day, with a another case this time concerns the safety, the calls for review of General Motors and their ignition systems. It is clear that the channels of communication in the manufacturers must be reviewed.
4. pride. I can’t think of another explanation for that Volkswagen would not have prevented advance which is to come. In may of 2014 (see timeline) have already been advised that their engines had detected a behavior which fit perfectly with what is expected of a defeat device. Far from it, and prepare for the consequences of the existence of this device illegal, Volkswagen doubted the thoroughness of those investigations and hoped that their products were free of fraud. Volkswagen has not seen, or not wanted to see, that there was a problem in their cars.
5. incompetence. And that is if they do not commit the sin above, the number 4, we would have to think that your sin then it has been the incompetence. Obviously, and speaking of a brand such as Volkswagen, we understand that has not been the case. It is difficult to explain that in the time that researchers, with very limited resources, by the way, have found a trick in their engines, Volkswagen is not what you could have identified, and could not have prepared for what was to come.
6. slow. Precisely because of the sins previously mentioned we can consider that the official thesis, the “plot” of a team of engineers, to be certain. And that is precisely where we find that Volkswagen has committed a new sin, a new error, responding with the utmost slowness to the problem to come. To this day we still don’t know the correction is exact that you will require each engine, which leads us to believe that Volkswagen is still working out the optimal solution that shall apply to each one of the engines affected.
7. lack of communication. Volkswagen was aware of what was going to happen, as soon, the 3 of September. Even so, presented with their best clothes in the Lounge of Frankfurt, which is perhaps the most important event of the year for the German brands. On the 19th of September was made public, the fraud of the TDI, and in Volkswagen as they were only prepared to acknowledge his error. By then, Volkswagen could already have had prepared answers to questions that necessarily we’d be, like, what are affected TDI marketed in Europe? For then it would also have been appropriate to have been put in contact with the customers, that these had not been heard before by the press. And be ready from that first instant of a channel of communication with customers, such as web-enabled two weeks later to check to see if your car was affected.